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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF INSURANCE
CONTRACTS UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
The main purpose of contract law is the realization of reasonable
1
expectations induced by promises. A. Corbin.
Insurance is a business built upon contracts. 2 With the increased use of standard form contracts, 3 courts have recognized
the need to reconcile traditional contract law with market realities. 4 Today, the private legislation of contracting parties faintly

resembles the free market ideal of a bargained for agreement.
Courts have observed attempts of the "powerful industrial and
commercial overlords ...

to impose a new feudal order of their

own making upon a vast host of vassals. '5 In response,
courts
6
have adopted the doctrine of reasonable expectations.
1. A. CORBIN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1960).
2. An insurance contract possesses five characteristics:
1) The insured must have an insurable interest-an interest in the insured property or insured life-capable of being valued in money;
2) The insured must be (or both parties must reasonably believe him to
be) subject to a possibility of loss through damage to or destruction of
his insurable interest by the happening of the casualty or death insured
against; 3) The insurer must legally assume such risk of loss in a fixed
or determinable amount; 4) As consideration for its assumption of risk
the insurer must collect all in advance or at periodic intervals in installments from the insured and all others of his class, a ratable contribution known as a premium; 5) Losses must be distributed by the insurer
among a large group of similar insureds by charges to the insurance
fund built up through the systematic collection of premiums paid by all
members of the insured class or group.
S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 900, at 12 (3d ed.
1963).
3. Leases, mortgages, theatre tickets, credit card purchase receipts and
parking lot tickets are standard form contracts. One commentator estimated that 99% of all modern contracts are standardized contracts. Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power,84 HARv. L. REV. 529 (1971).
4. For a list of contract doctrines traditionally invoked to protect the
reasonable expectations of the insured, see infra notes 46-52 and accompanying text. As members of a modern economy, we contract so frequently
with each other that most agreements are entered into with only a cursory
discussion of material contractual terms. The non-drafting party, however,
understands that he is assenting to unknown terms, subject to the limitations which the law may impose. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 211, comment b (1979).
5. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).

6. Lambert v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 331 So. 2d 260 (Ala. 1976); National
Indem. Co. v. Flesher, 460 P.2d 360 (Alaska 1970); Steven v. Fidelity & Casu-
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The essence of this doctrine is that courts will enforce the
objective, reasonable expectations of the average insurance policy holder, even though those expectations have been negated in
the policy provisions. 7 The reasonable expectations doctrine is
an equitable approach to the construction of insurance contracts. This approach guards against the insurer's use of complex and confusing policies to defeat the average insured's
reasonable expectations of coverage. 8 For example, an insured's
reasonable belief that his insurance policy covers liability arising out of his normal farming operations could subject the insurer to liability for claims arising out of aerial crop spraying,
9
regardless of contrary policy exclusions.
In theory, the expectations doctrine is an interpretive tool
courts use to discern the intention of the parties who are bound
alty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172, 377 P.2d 284 (1962); Bourchard v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 122, 253 A.2d 497 (1969); Steigler v. Ins.
Co. of N. Am., 384 A.2d 398 (Del. 1978); Commerce Natl. Bank v. Safeco Ins.
Co., 252 So. 2d 248, cert. denied 284 So. 2d 205 (Fla. App. 1969); Loftin v.
United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E. 2d 53 (1962); Corgatelli
v. Globe Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975); C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W. 2d 169 (Iowa 1975); Gowing v.
Great Plains Mut. Ins. Co., 207 Kan. 78, 483 P.2d 1072 (1971); Zurich Ins. Co.
v. Rombough, 384 Mich. 228, 180 N.W.2d 775 (1970); Estrin Construction Co.
v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 612 S.W.2d 413 (Mo. App. 1981); McAlear v.
St. Paul Ins. Co., 158 Mont. 452, 493 P.2d 331 (1972); Nile Valley Cooperative
Grain & Milling Co. v. Farmers Elevator Mut. Ins. Co., 187 Neb. 720, 193
N.W.2d 752 (1972); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev. 146, 425 P.2d 346
(1967); Magulas v. Travelers Ins. Co., 114 N.H. 704, 327 A.2d 608 (1974); Pribble v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 84 N.M. 211, 501 P.2d 255 (1972); Lachs v. Fidelity &
Casualty Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555, reh'g denied, 306 N.Y. 941, 120
N.E.2d 216 (1954) (In Lachs, the New York Court of Appeals did not expressly adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations, but its judgment
rests on the principles of the doctrine); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc.,
250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1977); Conner v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 496 P.2d 770
(Okla. 1972); CoUister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d 1346
(1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 1089 (1979); Herwig v. Enerson & Eggen, 98 Wis.
2d 38, 295 N.W.2d 201 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), aftd, 101 Wis. 2d 170, 303 N.W.2d
669 (1981).
7. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
8. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARv. L. REV. 961 (1970). The expectations doctrine was the basis
of a judgment which required an insurer to defend a workman's compensation action brought by the insured's domestic employee because the exclusion precluding coverage for such actions was hidden in the insured's
comprehensive homeowner's policy. Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 48

N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328 (1966).

9. Mills v. Agriculture Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D. 1977). In
North Dakota, the doctrine of reasonable expectations has been adopted
statutorily as well as judicially. The statute states, in part, "[If the terms of
a promise in any respect are ambiguous or uncertain, it must be interpreted
in the sense in which promisor believed at the time of making it that the
promisee understood it." N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-14 (1976).
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by insurance contracts. 10 The fundamental problem with the
doctrine, however, is that rather than aiding interpretation of insurance contracts, the doctrine has evolved into a means of
avoiding such contracts." To the extent that this doctrine alters
the otherwise legally enforceable agreement between the par12
ties, it is a species of judicial regulation of insurance contracts.
In adopting the expectations doctrine, a court must weigh contractual certainty against the social desirability of imposing extracontractual rights and duties upon the parties. Increasingly,
the courts are finding the latter desirable to protect the ordinary
3
policy holder untutored in the intricacies of insurance.'
This comment analyzes the development of the doctrine of
reasonable expectations from a traditional contract perspective.
Part I discusses the evolution and applications of the expectations doctrine. Part II examines whether the traditional doctrines of contract law satisfy the insured's reasonable
expectations. Part III analyzes the impact of the expectations
doctrine on the contracting parties and insurance law. Part IV
proposes common law and legislative alternatives which will
satisfy the actuarial requirements of the insurer as well as the
reasonable expectations of the insured. This comment concludes with a discussion of why the doctrine of reasonable expectations. is an unnecessary and unmanageable doctrine in the
construction of insurance contracts.
I.

EVOLUTION AND APPLICATIONS

4
The exact origin of the expectations doctrine is uncertain.'
In 1918, Justice Cardozo analyzed an insurance coverage issue
by considering the reasonable expectations of the "ordinary

10. See generally, Insured's "ReasonableExpectations"As to Coverage
of Insurance Policy, 20 Am. Jun. P.O.F. 2D 59 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Insured's Reasonable Expectation].
11. As one dissenting state supreme court justice stated: "Thus the

problem in deciding an insurance claim seems no longer to be one of ascertaining what the contract as written means, but of somehow divining the
'reasonable expectations' of the insured as to what the contract should
mean." Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 590, 388 A.2d 1346,
1357 (1978) (Pomeroy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979).
12. Professor Keeton of Harvard Law School has acknowledged that the
expectations doctrine goes beyond a mere rule of construction and is "a
measure of judicial regulation of insurance contracts." Keeton, Insurance
Lawyers View "Wayfaring Fool" Doctrine,Insurance Advocate, 21 (July 24,
1971).

13. As one court stated: "An insurer who selects standardized contracts
and offers them to the insured on a 'take-it-or-leave-it' basis, must assume
responsibilities . . .for confusion created in the mind of a non-expert insured." Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663, 668 (N.D. 1977).
14. See generally, Gardner, Reasonable Expectations.- Evolution Completed or Revolution Begun?, INS. L.J. 573 (1978).
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business man when making an ordinary business contract."' 5
Nearly thirty years later, Judge Learned Hand interpreted an insurance contract provision in conformance with the understanding of an ordinary insured. 16 In 1970, Professor Keeton
composed a succinct formulation of the expectations doctrine:
The objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended
beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored even though a painstaking study
17 of the policy provisions
would have negated those expectations.
The adhesive nature of insurance contracts has induced
many courts to support the expectations doctrine.' 8 Because
policy terms are dictated by underwriting requirements, the insured has little opportunity to bargain over terms or choose a
materially different form. 19 Consequently, judicial efforts to protect the insured from complex exclusionary language is founded
upon the concept that the insured has been effectively excluded
from any understanding of the "agreement" to which he has entered into. Another justification for the doctrine is that the protection of the expectation interest is an established goal of
15. Bird v. St. Paul Fire &Marine Ins. Co., 224 N.Y. 47, 49, 120 N.E. 86, 88
(1918).
16. Gaunt v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947).
17. Keeton, supra note 8, at 967. Keeton has also composed a corollary
to the expectations doctrine: "If the enforcement of a policy provision
would defeat the reasonable expectations of the great majority of policy
holders to whose claims it is relevant, it will not be enforced even against
those who know of its restrictive terms." Id. at 974.
Another commentator has formulated this doctrine: "The objectively
reasonable expectations of insureds or of beneficiaries, who actively negotiated the policies' terms, regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be
honored if such a reading as an ordinary layman could give the policy would
not have negated those expectations." Kelso, Idaho and the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations. A SpringboardFor An Analysis of a New Approach to a Valuable But Often Misunderstood Doctrine,47 INS. COUNS. J.
325, 328 (1980).
18. The majority of standard insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, i.e., contracts which are drafted by a party of superior bargaining
strength and offered to the weaker party on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. S.
WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 900 at 19-20. An adhesion contract is an agreement between the parties. A court must determine the extent, if any, to
which it will be enforced. Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579,
593, 388 A.2d 1346, 1360 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089 (1979). For a complete discussion on the judicial response to adhesive insurance contracts,
see Patterson, The Interpretationand Construction of Contracts,64 COLUM.
L. REV. 833 (1964) and Note, The Adhesion Contractof Insurance,5 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 60 (1964).
19. Underwriting is the "process of selecting risks for insurance and determining in what amounts and on what terms the insurance companies
will accept the risk." INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS

104 (1983).
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contract law. 20 The doctrine has also found judicial support because it promotes the dissemination of information on coverage 21 and provides a variety of coverage options which the
insured expects.

22

Courts adhering to the expectations doctrine have not
agreed upon whether the doctrine is applicable in the absence of
ambiguous terms. 23 A majority of adherents require ambiguity
before the doctrine may be applied. 24 These courts reason that
20. Contract law has traditionally protected three interests of the contracting parties: 1) the restitution interest which prevents unjust enrichment; 2) the reliance interest which undoes the harm caused by one party's
reliance on the other's promise; and 3) the expectations interest which
gives the promisee the value of the expectancy created by the promise. See
Fuller &Purdue, The Reliance Interest In ContractDamages: 1, 46 YALE L.J.
52 (1936).
When the law protects a party's expectation interest "[iIt ceases to act
defensively or restoratively, and assumes a more active role." Id. at 56.
Fuller and Perdue believe that the restitution interest presents the strongest case for judicial intervention because it involves a combination of "unjust impoverishment with unjust gain." Id.
21. See Abraham, Judge-MadeLaw And Judge-MadeInsurance: Honoring The Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L. REV. 1151, 1171
(1981).
In theory, the expectations doctrine penalizes the insurer for the inaccurate information the insured had concerning coverage. To avoid further
penalties, the insurer should more fully inform prospective insureds.
An insurer, however, will disseminate coverage information only when
the risk of increased liability outweighs the cost of such disclosure. Because it is difficult for the insurer to know whether the dissemination of
information is efficient in a particular case, the insurer may be assuming
the risk of adverse judgments.
22. Id. at 1185. Insurance is a device for distributing the costs of various
risks among groups of risk bearers. A court's decision to honor the insured's expectations may further this cost-spreading feature of insurance
by expanding the pool of risk bearers. For example, some passengers prefer not to fly on chartered airlines because they are less safe while others
are willing to take such risks. Courts can effectively force these two groups
together by honoring the insured's expectations of coverage on chartered
flights even though he purchased insurance for non-chartered flights. See
Steven v. Fidelity Casualty Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 27 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1962) (life insurance purchase through vending machine); Lachs v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
23. Insured's Reasonable Expectation, supra note 10, at 80-81. For a list
of states that apply the doctrine in the absence of ambiguity, see Goodhue,
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectationsin Massachusettsand New Hampshire: A ComparativeAnalysis, 17 NEW ENG. L. REV. 891, 901 n.57 (1982).
24. Note, ReasonableExpectations Approach To Insurance ContractInterpretationModified in Missouri,47 Mo. L. REV. 577, 580 (1982) (discussion
of a Missouri decision which repudiates the majority approach).
The courts in Iowa and New Jersey have experimented with both positions and ultimately adopted the majority approach. Chipokas v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 267 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1978); DiOrio v. New Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co.,
79 NJ. 257, 398 A.2d 1274 (1979). In Chipokas and DiOrio, the courts perceived the unfairness to the insurance companies of allowing the insured to
expand coverage beyond the coverage clearly delineated in their respective
policies.
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the insured does not need protection from unambiguous exclusions in the policy. 25 Ambiguity is not a great hurdle for any
court, however, because ambiguity can be discovered in unex26
pected or unclear policy language and extrinsic circumstances.
The doctrine of reasonable expectations has been utilized to
create precontractual liability on the part of the insurer. Several
courts have determined that regardless of clear language to the
contrary, insurance applicants are entitled to temporary insurance during the period between the date an application is submitted and the date of completion or termination of the
underwriting process. 27 Advocates of the temporary insurance
25. Illinois courts have adopted a similar approach to the construction
of insurance contracts. As a matter of public policy in Illinois, a clearly
written provision, not the insured's reasonable expectations, will govern
coverage. Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 78 Ill. 2d 420, 401 N.E.2d 539
(1980). In construing ambiguous provisions, the Illinois Supreme Court has
considered the insured's expectations; however, the basis of the court's rulings has not been the expectations doctrine but rather the construction of
ambiguous provisions in favor of the policy holder. Compare Menke (no
stacking of insurance policies where clearly precluded by policy language)
with Kaufmann v. Economy Fire & Cas. Co., 76 Ill. 2d 11, 389 N.E.2d 1150
(1979) (insured allowed to stack insurance policies where anti-stacking
clause was ambiguous); Squire v. Economy Fire &Cas. Co., 69 Ill. 2d 167, 370
N.E.2d 1044 (1977) (ambiguous anti-stacking clause construed liberally in
favor of the insured). See also First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Fidelity &Cas.
Co. N.Y., 428 F.2d 499, 501, (7th Cir.) (insured's reasonable expectations do
not control the policy's express terms) cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1970); Ins.
Co. of North America v. Adkisson, 121 Ill. App. 3d 224, 459 N.E.2d 310 (1984)
(expectations doctrine not used to circumvent unambiguous provision of
insurance policy); Bain v. Ben Trust Life Ins. Co., 123 Ill. App. 3d 1025, 463
N.E.2d 1082 (1984) (expectations doctrine not adopted in Illinois).
26. When a policy term is susceptible to more than one interpretation, it
is ambiguous. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. C.J. Gayfer's &Co., 366 So. 2d 1199, 1201
(Fla. App. 1979). Ambiguities can appear in three different ways. First, inconspicuous clauses which fail to warn the insured of limitations of coverage are commonly labeled ambiguous. Read v. Western Farm Bureau Mut.
Ins. Co., 90 N.M. 369, 374, 563 P.2d 1162, 1167 (1977) (ambiguity found where
insured did not understand poorly defined terms). Second, inaccurately defined terms are also considered ambiguous. See Corgatelli v. Globe Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 96 Idaho 616, 533 P.2d 737 (1975) (ambiguity found in a
policy which guaranteed payment for dislocation of collar bone even though
a bone cannot be dislocated). Third, extrinsic information such as the
agent's statements or statements in a borchure may cause in ambiguity.
See Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 674, 458 N.E.2d 611
(1983) (ambiguity found where insurer's advertising brochure contradicted
the exclusionary provisions of the policy). Professor Keeton has observed
that courts sometimes invent ambiguity where none exists. Keeton. supra
note 8, at 972.
27. See, e.g., Turner v. Worth Ins. Co., 106 Ariz. 132, 472 P.2d 1 (1970);
Smith v. Westland Life Ins. Co., 15 Cal. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433, 123 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1975) (policy not terminated until insurance company actually rejects policy application and paid premium); Toevs v. Western Fain Bureau Life Ins.
Co., 94 Idaho 151,483 P.2d 682 (1971); Simpson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 227 Md.
393, 177 A.2d 417 (1962); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208
A.2d 638 (1965) (prepayment consituted acceptance to coverage where insured died 24 hours after issuance); Damm v. National Ins. Co. of America,
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rule reason that applicants reasonably expect immediate coverage when they submit an application and pay the first month's
28
premium to the insurer.
Where insurance policies have been issued, some courts
have used the expectations doctrine to mandate extracontractual coverage where a policy contained coverage restrictions
29
which either rendered the policy of little value to the insured,
3
0
failed to afford the insured clear warning of noncoverage or denied coverage. 31 Thus, where a policy bestows coverage on one
200 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1972) (prepayment of premium constitutes acceptance
of interim insurance).
28. See generally Warner, Pre-Contractual Liability, 12 FORUM 281
(1976). There are legitimate reasons for requiring payment of the first
month's premium in advance of coverage being effective. As Professor Williston has noted:
During the period when the applicant's offer [application] is outstanding and unaccepted by the company, the offeror [applicant] has the
power to revoke his offer. Should he do so, the company not only loses
its expected underwriting profit but is also out the cost of the medical
examination and related expenses of securing and processing the application. Such costs are particularly burdensome where a considerable
volume of the company's business consists of applications for policies
in small dollar amounts.
S. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 902, at 197-201.
The temporary insurance rule also allows one who is an uninsurable
risk to secure coverage for as long as it takes the insurer to discover that the
applicant is not an insurable risk. Even without the expectations doctrine,
courts can find interim coverage for insurable applicants by ruling that the
insurer's acceptance of an application and payment creats a contract subject to a condition subsequent, that the applicant is insurable at the time of
the application. Unless the insurer can establish the applicant was uninsurable at that time, the applicant would have temporary insurance under the
contract. See APPLEMAN, 12A INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 7237-43
(1943).
29. See Kievet v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 34 N.J. 475, 170 A.2d 22
(1961) (provisions would defeat the insured's purpose for obtaining coverage if read literally and applied mechanically).
30. Courts have found that the reasonable expectations of the insured
were violated where a policy has contained: 1) a provision confusing to the
average consumer, Gerhardt v. Continental Ins. Co., 48 N.J. 291, 225 A.2d 328
(1966); 2) a general coverage provision followed by restrictive definitions, C.
& J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (general coverage for burglary followed by restrictive definition of burglary); or
3) a restrictive provision preceded and followed by language emphasizing
benefits. Atwood v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 110 N.H. 636, 365 A.2d
744 (1976).
31. See Gyler v. Mission Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 3d 216, 514 P.2d 1219, 110 Cal.
Rptr. 139 (1973). In Gyler, the insured purchased malpractice insurance
wherein the insurer assumed liability for the insured's professional negligence as long as the claim was made within the policy period. The insurer
refused to defend Gyler when a former client filed suit after the policy period had expired. The court held that Gyler could reasonably have expected coverage for the claim in question because without it, attorneys
would have no coverage for claims brought against them after their retirement. In other words, the court found that imposing coverage desirable
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page and imperceptibly takes it away on another page, courts
are likely to honor the insured's reasonable expectations in light
of the deceptive policy. To the extent the expected coverage is
not independently available, some courts have tacked such coverage onto existing policies. 32 Courts commonly use the expectations doctrine to construe an ambiguous term in accordance
with the insured's reasonable expectations. 33 For example, an
insurer was held liable under its policy, which excluded coverage for rental of the insured machines, because the insured
would not reasonably expect the rental exclusion to apply when
34
the insured allowed prospective buyers to test the machines.
Several courts have gone further by mandating retroactive
insurance coverage where the insureds not only did not buy, but
knew they did not buy such coverage. 35 In C. & J. Fertilizer,Inc.
v. Allied Mutual Insurance Company,36 the insured purchased a
"Merchandise Burglary and Robbery Policy" which excluded
coverage if there were no visible marks of forced entry on the
exterior of the premises. 37 The insured warehouse was robbed
but there were no visible marks on the exterior door.3 8 Although the insured knew of the express exclusion, the Iowa
Supreme Court held the insurer liable for the loss based, in part,
upon the expectations doctrine. 39 The burglary insurance policy
was judicially reconstructed to provide coverage which the insured knew he did not purchase but which the average insured
would reasonably expect.
Another example in which retroactive insurance coverage
40
was imposed is Karol v. New Hampshire Insurance Company.
In Karol, the insured sought recovery under an all-risk policy
for damage to his documentary film during developing. 41 The
policy excluded "loss or damage . . . due to any process or
[damage sustained] while being actually worked upon and rerather than actually expected.

See generally Comment, The "Claims-Made"
Dilemma in ProfessionalLiability Insurance,22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 925 (1975).

32. Abraham, supra note 21, at 1163.
33. See, e.g., Chalmers v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 86 Mich. App. 25, 272
N.W.2d 188 (1978) (court construed the term "totally disabled" according to
the insured's reasonable expectations).
34. Herwig v. Enerson & Eggen, 98 Wis. 2d 38, 295 N.W.2d 201 (1980),
affd, 101 Wis. 2d 170, 303 N.W.2d 669 (1981).
35. Goodhue, supra note 23, at 900.
36. 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
37. Id. at 171.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 177.
40. 120 N.H. 287, 414 A.2d 939 (1980).
41. Id. at 289, 414 A.2d at 940.
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sulting therefrom. '42 In imposing coverage, the New Hampshire
Supreme Court stated that the insured's reasonable expectations are not defeated by inconspicuous exclusions even where
43
the insured read and fully understood the policy exclusion.
These applications of the expectations doctrine illustrate a
clear departure of American insurance law from English insurance law. 44 The courts of Canada and Great Britain have
adopted the attitude that as long as the insurance business is
carried on without any risk of pervasive losses through insolvency, insurance coverage should be left to the control of competitive forces in the insurance market. 45 In contrast, almost
one-half of American state courts have adopted the doctrine of
reasonable expectations to control insurance coverage. Before
analyzing this departure, it is necessary to understand how the
common law traditionally protects the insured's reasonable
expectations.
II.

TRADITIONAL REMEDIES

To protect the expectations of insureds against undiscovered exclusions and limitations in their policies, courts have traditionally invoked the following doctrines: unconscionability, 46
estoppel, 47 waiver, 48 implied warranty of fitness, 49 reformation, 50
construction of ambiguities against the insurer who drafted the
policy, 51 and public policy. 52 These doctrines will be analyzed to
42. Id.
43. Id. at 290-91, 414 A.2d at 941.
44. Keeton, Reasonable Expectations in the Second Decade, 12 FORUM
275, 280 (1976).
45. Pickering, The Control of Insurance Business In Great Britain,1969
Wis. L. REV. 1141, 1166; Gardner,supra note 14, at 579.
46. See, e.g., C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d
169 (Iowa 1975). But see Royal Indemnity Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (no unconscionability where adverse term
was product of negotiations between two industrial giants). See generally
Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 1151
(1976).
47. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United Ins. Co. of America, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1132,
424 N.E.2d 1216 (1981); Bowler v. Fidelity &Casualty Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d
580 (1969).
48. See generally, Morris, Waiver and Estoppel in InsurancePolicy Litigation, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1957); Corbin,supra note 1, § 1376 at 21.
49. See, e.g., C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co. 227 N.W.2d
169 (Iowa 1975); Mills v. Agrichemical Aviation, Inc., 250 N.W.2d 663 (N.D.
1977).
50. See generally76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments§ 18 (1952); A. APPLEMAN, 13 INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7608 (1976).
51. For the general rule of liberal construction of ambiguities in favor of
the insured, see 43 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance § 271 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Strickland v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 240 Ga. 723, 242 S.E.2d 148
(1978).
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determine whether the traditional doctrines of contract law satisfy the reasonable expectations of the average insured.
Under the doctrine of unconscionability, a court may refuse
to enforce any contract provision which is patently oppressive to
the insured. 53 In general, this doctrine is used when a contract
has been created through procedurally unfair means and incorporates terms which unreasonably favor one party. 54 Although
the doctrine of unconscionability has not had a great impact on
insurance law, it can protect the insured from oppression and
unfair surprise. 55 Indeed, some courts have recognized that unconscionability is an alternative to the expectations doctrine
where the insured's expectations were at variance with the un56
conscionable policy provisions.
Another doctrine used by courts to remedy problems arising
from insureds' unfamiliarity with contract provisions is estoppel.57 When the insurer represents a present or past fact to the
insured who detrimentally relies on that representation, the insurer is estopped from denying the truth of that representation.
Because insurance agents and consumers usually discuss the
consumer's broad insurance needs, the doctrine of estoppel can
create insurance coverage for risks which are not included in the
58
policy but which were the focus of the parties' discussion.
Moreover, estoppel is available where the misrepresentation
was innocently made before the policy was issued. 59 Thus, the
doctrine of estoppel provides relief to the insured who elicits
coverage terms from his agent's promises and detrimentally relies on the promises thereby created.
For almost a century courts have held that where an insurer
or his authorized agent intentionally relinquishes a known and
53.
54.
55.
56.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1979).
Id.
Gardner, supra note 14, at 577.
Smith v. Western Life Ins. Co., 15 Col. 3d 111, 539 P.2d 433 (1975)

(holding that keeping premiums without providing coverage was unconscionable); C. & J. Fertilizer Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169
(Iowa 1975) (finding the policy's definition of liability unconscionable).

57. As one court observed:
Estoppel refers to an abatement raised by law, of rights and privileges
of the insurer where it would be inequitable to permit their assertion;
such relinquishment need not be voluntary, intended or desired by the
insurer, but it necessarily requires some prejudicial reliance of the in-

sured upon some act, conduct or non-action of the insurer.
National Discount Shoes v. Royal Globe Ins., 99 Ill. App. 3d 54, 57, 424 N.E.2d
1166, 1170 (1981).
58. See Armstrong v. United Ins. Co., 98 Ill. App. 3d 1132, 424 N.E.2d 1216
(1981) (holding the insurer accountable by agent's expectation to the insured of his rights).
59. See Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co., 54 N.J. 287, 255 A.2d 208 (1969).
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existing right, the insurer has waived that right. 60 The insured
does not have to suffer a detriment to claim that an insurance
provision has been waived.6 1 For example, older fire and automobile insurance policies required the insured to warrant that
he had sole ownership of the insured property. 62 Courts readily
found these requirements waived when the agent failed to inquire about the insured's title when the policy was issued. 63 In a
more recent case, the insurer waived a requirement that the insured possess an insurable interest in the property because the
insured had knowledge to the contrary. 64 These examples illustrate that courts will not permit an insurer to sit on its rights,
collect premiums, and then assert those rights to defeat the in65
sured's reasonable expectations.
An alternative approach taken by courts where an insurance policy fails to fulfill its essential purpose is to impose cov66
erage through the doctrine of implied warranty of fitness.
Since the insurance applicant depends on the insurance agent's
judgment to sell the applicant a policy which suits his needs, the
agent may implicitly warrant that the provisions in the policy
satisfy the applicant's expressed needs. 67 Although implied
warranties are rarely applied to insurance contracts, the doctrine is consistent with traditional contract law that infers contractual terms from the conduct of the parties.
Disappointed policy holders have also argued that the insurance policy does not express the real intentions of the con60. See, e.g., Early v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 178 Pa. 631, 36 A. 195 (1897)
(insurer found to have waived defense when it negotiated with plaintiff
without telling him they intended to assert a defense); Mutual Savings Life
Ins. Co. v. Noah, 291 Ala. 444, 282 So.2d 271 (1974) (insurer obligated to pay

proceeds of policy, even when the insured died during a defaulting period,
when it retained the late payment).
61. Salloum Foods & Liquor, Inc. v. Parliament Ins. Co., 69 In. App. 3d

442, 388 N.E.2d 23 (1979) (insurer waived one year statute of limitation for
refusing to return insured's copy of the policy despite fact insured was informed of limitations period).
62. Morris, supra note 48, at 926.
63. Id. at 39.
64. Republic Ins. Co. v. Silverton Elevators, Inc., 493 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.
1973) (knowledge of agent that the insured did not own the household

goods was imputed to insurer).
65. Most states require by statute that after a predetermined number of
years, the validity of a policy is uncontestable, i.e., the insurer is barred
from asserting that the applicant's statements were fraudulent as the basis
for invalidating the policy. R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw,
§ 6.5(d) (1971).
66. See generally Note, Burglary Insurance Policies-ReasonableExpectations-Unconscionability-Applicationof Implied Warranty of Fitness, 9
AKRON L. REV. 584 (1976).
67. See supra note 50.
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tracting parties, and therefore should be reformed. 6 8
Reformation is a remedy available only when there is either mutual mistake or fraud on the part of one and mistake on the part
of the other.69 Whether a mistake is one of law or one of fact,
courts will reform the contract to reflect the true intent of the
parties. 70 The insured who negligently fails to familiarize him7
self with the policy terms, however, cannot seek reformation. '
These doctrines are part of the framework of traditional contract law. Each doctrine assumes that freedom of contract requires the court to interpret contracts, but not to make them.
By merely labeling a document "contract", however, courts are
not committed "to an indiscriminate extension of the ordinary
contract rules to all contracts. '72 Thus, courts have relied on
their prerogative of interpretation to add unique doctrines to the
traditional rules of contract interpretation and construction
73
when dealing with insurance policies.
These specialized doctrines include the doctrine of contra
proferentuM, 74 adhesion, 75 and the principle of the wayfaring
fool.7 6 The doctrine of contra proferentum requires that ambiguities in a contract be interpreted against the contract maker regardless of the relative bargaining strength of the parties. 77 In
applying this doctrine, courts will interpret ambiguous lan68. See, e.g., Mutual of Omaha Ins., Co. v. Russel, 402 F.2d 339 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. den., 394 U.S. 973; Hammel v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 246 Mich. 80, 224 N.W. 337 (1929) (granting reformation upon mutual
mistake of law).

69. See supra note 51.
70. See, e.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Rabinovitz, 227 F.2d 300
(5th Cir. 1955) (mistake of fact); Hammel v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 246 Mich. 80, 224 N.W. 337 (1929) (mistake of law).
71. Gardner, supra note 14, at 578.
72. Kessler, supra note 5, at 633.
73. The use of unique doctrines has been criticized by one

commentator:
Given the proper combination of contract language and factual situation, the causes of "fairness" and "equity" can be equally served by
either approach-application of an independent doctrine which largely
ignores policy language or strained construction of existing policy language. The difficulty lies in the fact that the prevailing judicial ratio-

nales are often so camouflaged by reference to "established rules" that
it is impossible to pair a given situation with the appropriate doctrine
so as to achieve a high degree of predictability. The law is left in an

untidy state where neither party to the insurance contract knows precisely what the contract does or does not provide until after the fact of
litigation.
Young, Lewis, & Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretation:Issues and Trends,
625 INs. L.J. 73 (Feb. 1975).
74. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.

75. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
76. See infra note 81 and accompanying text.
77. Insured's Reasonable Expectation, supra note 10, at 75.
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guage, where semantically possible, to provide the insured with
coverage for the losses to which his insurance policy relates. 78 In
construing the plain and ordinary meaning of ambiguities, a
79
court will not consider the drafter's intent.
The doctrine of adhesion requires that all contract ambiguities be interpreted against the insurer because of the disparity
of bargaining strength between the parties.8 0 In contrast, the
wayfaring fool principle requires that an insurer use language
that is sufficiently clear so that a wayfaring man, however foolish, would not be deceived.8 1 Although this principle is utilized
occasionally, contra proferentum is repeated "with almost mo82
notonous regularity."
It is evident that the insured has an extensive list of general
and specialized doctrines to protect him from latent defects in
his insurance contract. If the insured's reasonable expectations
are induced by the insurer's promises or conduct, the insured
can assert the doctrine of waiver or estoppel when his expectations differ from the policy provisions. If the insured's relies on
his agent to select an appropriate policy, a court will not allow
the insurer to defeat those expectations by selecting a policy
containing unconscionable, inappropriate or ambiguous provisions. In short, the traditional contract law doctrines honor the
insured's reasonable expectations when the insured can establish a rational basis for those expectations.
III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE REASONABLE

EXPECTATIONS DOCTRINE
The doctrine of reasonable expectations is a judicial rationale which balances justice and freedom of contract. Unfortunately, this rationale has evolved from an equitable approach to
contract construction into the unbridled reconstruction of insurance contracts.8 3 It is essential, therefore, to consider the impli78. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104 (1966); Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Ins. Ass'n, 57 ]11. 2d 330, 312
N.E.2d 247 (1974) (where insured had purchased three policies from the

same insurer, he was not limited to what he would recover under one
policy).
79.
80.
COUCH
81.

Young, Lewis, & Lee, supra note 7, at 74.
See generally 43 Am. JuR. 2d Insurance§ 271 (1979); R. ANDERSON, 1
ON INSURANCE 2d § 15:73 (1959).
Insured's Reasonable Expectations,supra note 10, at 75.
82. S. WILLISTON, supra note 2, § 900 at 17.
83. In rejecting the doctrine of reasonable expectations, the Idaho

Supreme Court concluded:
Reliance on this traditional approach avoids the danger that the court
might create liability by construction of the contract terms or creation
of a new contract for the parties. In the event that there is an ambiguity
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cations of this doctrine which could ultimately entitle an
insured or applicant to every benefit imaginable within a contractual framework.
The first implication of the expectations doctrine is that existing doctrines of contract construction fail to protect the insured's reasonable expectations. Proponents of the
expectations doctrine argue that despite traditional contract
remedies, the insured is vulnerable to an insurer who unilaterally places unambiguous coverage restrictions in its standard
form policy which the insured is unlikely to read. 84 This argument fails to take into account that traditional notions of contract formation require the insured's assent, express or implied,
to policy terms. 85 Traditional contract law does not bind in-

sureds to unknown terms in their standard form contracts which
eviscerate the terms agreed upon. 86 Thus, the expectations doctrine is unnecessary because the insured has traditionally been
in the terms of the policy, special rules of construction apply to insurance contracts to protect the insured.
Since these rules protect the insured under a more traditional approach, it becomes unnecessary to adopt a new theory of recovery
where, conceivably, the periphery of what losses would be covered
could be extended by an insured's affidavit of what he "reasonably expected" to be covered.
Casey v. Highland Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 600 P.2d 1387 (1979).
84. Compare Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 479 Pa. 579, 388 A.2d
1346 (1978) (insured under no duty to read policy), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1089
(1979), with Dobosz v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 120 Ill. App. 3d 458 N.E.2d
611 (1983) (insured charged with notice of the contents if the insurance policy made available). For an interesting discussion on the duty to read, see
Macaulay, Private Legislation and The Duty To Read-Business Run by
IBM Machine, The Law of Contractsand Credit Cards,19 VAND. L. REV. 1051
(1966).
85. A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 3; Kessler, supra note 5, at 630. An insured's signature on the contract is usually a suitable manifestation of assent, however, the parameters of that assent are debatable. The
Restatement (Second) of Contracts adopts the view that the signer has assented to "terms not read or understood, subject to such limitations as the

law may impose."

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 211 comment b

(1979). This view has been criticized because the signer is ignorant of the
contract's terms or their existence until the transaction is consumated,
therefore, this blind assent is no assent. Slawson, supra note 3, at 541.
One commentator has concluded that a bifurcated assent theory is required to explain consumer assent to insurance contracts. Lashner, A Common Law Alternative To The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in The
Construction of Insurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1175, 1192 (1982).
Under this theory, the consumer gives his general assent to procedural provisions, which give the contract its full effect, though unknown. Id. at 1197.
The consumer must give his specific assent, however, to provisions delineating the bargained for coverage, including exclusions of or limitations
on that coverage. Id. The insurer cannot enforce any exclusion or limitation unless it can establish these provisions were adequately explained to
the insured. Id. For an application of Lashner's theory, see Hionis v. Northern Mutual Ins. Co., 230 Pa. Super. 511, 327 A.2d 363 (1974).
86. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states:
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protected from unknown and contradictory terms in his standardized agreement.
The second implication of the expectations doctrine is that
it leads courts toward two bodies of contract law. Courts differ
on whether the contours of traditional contract law apply to insurance contracts. 87 Many courts tend to treat insurance contracts as sui generis.88 As the reasonable expectations of the
insured become a paramount consideration over the contractual
language, traditional contract principles become inapplicable to
insurance law because the rationales underlying each form of
contract law are unique and polar. Underlying the traditional
approach is the rationale that courts should not interfere with
Similarly, a party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does
not assent to a term if the other party has reason to believe that the
adhering party would not have accepted the agreement if he had known
that the agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown ...

from the fact that [the term] eviscerates

the non-standard terms explicitly agreed to ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment f (1979). See also K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960)
(fine print which has not been read cannot undercut the dickered terms).
87. The courts have been criticized for their tendency to "pay merely lip
service to the dogma that the common law of contracts governs insurance
contracts." Kessler, supra note 5, at 635. Compare Penn-Air Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 439 Pa. 511, 517, 269 A.2d 19, 22 (1970) (law of contracts not
changed because contract pertains to insurance) with Satz v. Massachusetts Bonding &Ins. Co., 243 N.Y. 385, 153 N.E. 844, 846 (1926) ("What do they
know of the law of the insurance contract who only the law of contract
know?").
88. There are several characteristics of an insurance contract which theoretically set it apart from other commercial contracts. The first differentiating characteristic is that insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion.
Because the terms of insurance contracts are substantially dictated by actuarial tables and statutes, the applicant has little opportunity to negotiate
changes in the proposed contract. This differentiation, however, is suspect
because the standardized commercial contract is so common and so complicated that the parties rarely haggle over its standard terms. Thus, the contrast between the negotiated commercial contract and the adhered to
insurance contract is anything but conspicuous.
Another distinguishing characteristic is that the public views the insurance policy as chattel rather than as contract. "The prevalence of airplane
and other trip or voyage accident insurance coin-operated coupon-dispensed machines probably adds measurably to this prevailing tendency to
look upon 'protection' as a purchasable commodity rather than as a result of
a personal contract between the insurer and insured." S. WILLISTON, supra
note 2, § 900, at 34. The courts have adopted this "chattel approach" with
negotiable instruments and collective labor agreements. Id. at 35-37.
The third differentiating characteristic is that the insurance consumer
receives only a conditional promise for his premium; therefore, such contracts have inherent potential of being oppressive. Young, Lewis, & Lee,
supra note 73, at 75. Even though no present tangible benefit passes to the
insurance applicant, this does not establish that the insurer will perform in
bad faith. Nor does it leave the insured in any different position than a
party to a standard contract incorporating conditions precedent and/or conditions subsequent.
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freedom of contract where the intent of the parties is expressed
by clear and unambiguous language.8 9 In contrast, the expectations doctrine is built upon the rationale that an insurance policy is not a negotiated agreement, and therefore the rights and
duties of the parties are governed not by a document, but by the
"dynamics of the transaction viewed in its entirety." 90 These
disparate rationales not only generate a dual system of contract
law, but each rationale challenges the other's applicability to the
construction of standardized contracts.
Insurance contracts, like the vast majority of modern contracts, are standardized to keep the cost of writing, performing
and enforcing them within reasonable limits. 91 The insurance
purchaser usually agrees on the premium, the duration, the
amount of coverage and the subject matter to be covered. The
remaining provisions are written by the insurer only. Under
89. A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 559, at 268. In other words, the court's
function is not to rewrite express and unambiguous terms in a contract to
comport with what it deems a fair result under the circumstances. See, e.g.,
R. ANDERSON, 1 COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 14136, at 616 (1959) (court not

authorized to rewrite the terms of clear binder).
90. Collister v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 478 Pa. 579, 588, 388 A.2d 1346,
1354 (1978), cert. denied,439 U.S. 1089 (1979). In Collister,the applicant was
informed that a physical examination and home office approval were prerequisites to coverage. Id. at 588, 388 A.2d at 1361. The Collistercourt held
that a contract of insurance came into being between the applicant and the
insurer at the time the insurer accepted the application and first premium
payment. Id. at 586, 388 A.2d at 1354. The court reasoned that the public had
a right to expect immediate coverage for the premium paid, and therefore,
the applicant who died had temporary coverage prior to his medical examination and insurer's home office approval. Id.
In Collister,the court stated that "the reasonable expectations of the
insured clearly become important once the courts had decided that normal
contract principles were no longer applicable in insurance transactions." Id.
at 586, 388 A.2d at 1351. Thus, the doctrine of reasonable expectations is not
a supplement, but rather a replacement of traditional contract law in construing insurance contracts. The Collister decision bases the consumer's
reasonable expectations on the insurance transaction rather than the insurance contract. Such an adjustment is likely to expand coverage because a
transactional basis is inherently broader than a contractual basis.
91. The standardized form contract is not only a pervasive fixture in the
insurance industry, but is also an economic necessity. Standard form insurance contracts spare both parties the time and cost of legal counsel ordinarily necessary for the bargaining and drafting of a negotiated agreement.
Moreover, the form insurance contract informs the parties how to conduct
themselves under anticipated contingencies. Finally, the form insurance
contract enforces such conduct by conditioning the insurance coverage on
the performance of that conduct. The cost of producing these contracts are
minimized by spreading the mechanical and legal costs of production over a
large number of users. For the insured, the hidden cost in standardized
contracts is the expense of enforcing his reasonable expectations which are
at variance with the standardized contract. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment a (1979) (utility of standardization);
Kessler, supra note 5, at 632 (stating standardized contracts "belong in the
same category as codifications and restatements.").
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traditional contract law, such a transaction is viewed as the formation of a negotiated agreement which is enforceable only to
the extent the writing expresses the intent of the parties. Under
the expectations doctrine, the same transaction is viewed as the
formation of a non-negotiated agreement which is enforceable
only to the extent the writing expresses the reasonable expectations of the insured.
A third implication of the expectations doctrine is that the
insurance consumer will receive every possible benefit of the
transaction. First, the expectations doctrine does not require a
court to consider the insurer's contractual expectations. Thus,
the fact that the insurer has a sound reason for including a restrictive provision in the contract is immaterial to a court's determination of the coverage intended and afforded. 92 Moreover,
the insured's expectations can be based on noncontractual
sources. 93 Finally, a sophisticated insured who understands the
coverage restrictions in his policy may receive a windfall of coverage which the average insured reasonably expects. The informed insured has an advantage because courts are reluctant
to reward the uninformed insured with more protection than the
informed insured would expect. 94 Thus, the expectations doctrine improperly affords coverage which some insureds did not
reasonably expect.
The final implication of the expectations doctrine is that the
insured will ultimately pay the premiums which cover the risk
of unenforceable coverage restrictions. 95 Policy language is
92. In a burglary insurance policy, an insurer frequently conditions coverage on a showing of forced marks of entry on the outside of the insured
premises. This condition protects the insurer against an "inside job," however the expectations doctrine ignores such underwriting rationales to the
benefit of the insured. See, e.g., C. &J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co.,

227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975). For a discussion of the rationale behind conditional health insurance, see supra note 28.

93. The common belief that one can expect to get something in return
for their money has translated into temporary insurance. See supranote 27
and accompanying text; see also Glidden v. Farmers Automobile Ins. Ass'n.,
57 Ill. 2d 330, 312 N.E.2d 247 (1974) (stacking insurance policies).
94. See Insured's ReasonableExpectations,supra note 10, at 83. Profes-

sor Keeton stated:
It is a sound rule to strike down a surprising policy provision uniformly,
sustaining even the claim of the occasional policyholder who can be
shown to have known of its restrictive terms. To apply a different rule

among various policyholders would produce the result that those who
remained ignorant of the terms would receive substantially more pro-

tection for their premium dollars than those aware of them.
95. Coverage restrictions reflect the insurer's underwriting decisions,
i.e., what risks, in what amounts, and on what terms. See supra note 19.
When a restriction is voided, the underwriting operation is undermined, if

not completely abandoned. At this point, the insurer will either increase its
premiums or decrease its coverage in order to avoid further underwriting
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drafted to meet the economic and legal requirements of insurance companies. 96 Because it is difficult for the insurer to know
which insured's expectations are contrary to the policy provisions, the insurer is likely to raise premiums to account for the
actuarial uncertainty. Moreover, the public is prejudiced when
an insurer's liabilities are stretched over risks that could not be
profitably underwritten for a fair premium. As a result, many
insurance companies will cease writing policies for the unprofitable insurance risks and those insurance companies which continue to write those policies will force many potential insureds
out of the market.
These implications of the doctrine of reasonable expectations illustrate the unmanageability of the doctrine. Many
courts are utilizing the doctrine to bypass traditional contract
principles and to impose their sense of justice on the market
place. This contrivance affords some insureds with coverage
they neither expected nor paid for. Even Professor Keeton, who
losses. See Crawford v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 56 Ill. 2d 41, 305
N.E.2d 144 (1973) (defense based on lack of eligibility, not barred by an unconscionability clause).
To the extent courts determine the scope of an insurer's coverage, the
insurer will take steps to protect its fund from risks that cannot be underwritten. One of these steps is to allocate a greater fraction of each premium
dollar to its reserves. In life insurance, the "reserve is an amount that, together with future premiums, all accumulated at an assumed rate of interest, will suffice to satisfy the company's future obligations as predicted by
specified mortality tables. So long as the company has assets to match this
reserve liability, it is solvent." Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L.
REV. 471, 483 (1961).
Of each dollar of income received by U.S. insurance companies, $.715
comes from premiums and $.285 comes from net investment earnings.
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, FACT BOOK (1982). The following
shows how each premium dollar received from insurance purchasers is
spent:
$ .466
Benefit payments to policy holders
$ .324
Addition to policy reserve funds
$ .019
Addition to special reserves
$ .001
Commission to agents
$ .096
Home and Field Office expenses
$ .023
Taxes
$ .011
Dividends to shareholders
The underwriting operations of insurance companies do not always
generate profits. In fact, property and casualty insurance companies have
shown profits on underwriting operations in only nine of the last 25 years.
INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, INSURANCE FACTS 19 (1983). In 1981
alone, the insurance industry was subject to 235 million dollar verdicts. Id.
at 52. Fortunately, property and casualty insurers recorded $14,906,655,340
in investment income for the year 1982. Id. at 20.
96. Insurance companies execute thousands of standard policies using
a printed form prepared and approved by its actuaries, officers and attorneys. A. CORBIN,supra note 1, at § 559. For a discussion of insurance regulators, see infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
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strongly advocates the doctrine, concedes that it is "too general
to serve as a guide from which particularized decisions can be
derived through an exercise of logic, and too broad to be universally true. . .. -97 To avoid these implications of the expectations doctrine, an alternative must be implemented.
IV.

PROPOSALS

A viable alternative to the doctrine of reasonable expectations must protect the insurance consumer from latent pitfalls
in his standardized policy without creating the impression of judicial prejudice against insurers. A list of potential alternatives
can be gleaned from judicial, legislative and administrative remedies presently available to the disappointed insured. Each alternative attempts to satisfy the insured's reasonable
expectations.
Use of the doctrine of unconscionability is a promising remedy for the insured because it allows a court to pass on the substantive fairness of a contract provision.98 Regardless of the
parties' promises and conduct, a court can strike a term which
patently favors the drafter of a standard form contract. 99 Unconscionability allows a court to get beyond freedom of contract
where it can protect the weaker party's interests. Moreover, a
court's determination that a contract or term is unconscionable
is based not just on the facts which favor one party, but on all
the material facts. 100
The presence of unconscionable terms, however, is not nec10 1
essarily due to imperfections in the bargaining process. '
97. Keeton, supra note 8, at 967.
98. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 comment a (1979) ("Particularly in the case
of standardized agreements, the rule in this Section permits the court to
pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or clause rather than
to avoid unconscionable results by interpretation.").
99. "Standardized contracts such as insurance policies, drafted by powerful commercial units and put before individuals on the 'accept this or get
nothing' basis, are carefully scrutinized by the purpose of avoiding enforcement of 'unconscionable' clauses." A. CORBIN, supra note 1, § 1376, at 21.
100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 comment f (1979). This
approach would allow the insurer to present the underwriting rationale behind the coverage restriction at variance with the insured's reasonable expectations, thereby avoiding the appearance of unprincipled judicial
prejudice against the insurer. See supra note 97.
101. Even the best negotiator may adhere to an oppressive insurance
contract if he or she is not sufficiently informed to act rationally. "Complex
fine-print standard forms might be viewed as goods whose quality people
cannot determine." Korhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1177 (1976). Thus, the existence of oppressive terms in
form contracts may not reflect the imperfection of the bargaining process,
but the imperfection of coverage dissemination.
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When a consumer cannot sort through the complex, finely
printed standard form, it becomes difficult for him to even discern the value of that policy. Standard policy statutes are an
efficient means of providing the public with plain,10 2 easy to understand 10 3 insurance policies. Although the typical American
insurance code has been labeled "a rubbish heap without parallel in the law-making of modern man," legislation is more likely
10 4
to promote understandable policies than judicial action.
There are essentially two benefits to plainly written policies.
102. For an example of "Plain Talk Car Policy" see Gardner, supra note
14, 584-86. The following is an excerpt from Sentry Insurance Company's
"Plain Talk Car Policy":
Our Promises To You
We Promise to pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for
which the law holds you responsible because of a car accidentinvolving
a car we insure. We also promise to pay additional benefits.
Additional Benefits
These benefits are in addition to our limit of liability for damages.
We'll pay for the cost of investigating the car accident and arranging
for the settlement of any claim against you. We'll also defend you,
hire and pay a lawyer, and pay all defense costs if you're sued by
someone for damages because of a car accident-even if the accusations aren't true. However, we won't be obligated to pay for the cost
of any further investigation or arrangement for settlement or to defend you further after we've paid our entire limit of liability for
damages.
Id. at 584-85.
103. For a list of successfully marketed "Easy-To-Understand" policies
see Young, Lewis & Lee, supra note 73, at 72.
104. Kimball, Unfinished Business In Insurance Regulation, 1969 Wis. L.
REV. 1019. In 1980, several states passed legislation requiring title insurance
policies to be written in clear and understandable language. R. KRATOviL &
WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAw § 11.06(b)
(8th ed. 1983). Compare the
readibility of the following Residential Title Insurance Policies, one written
before plain language legislation, the other after such legislation.
Before: 2. Continuation of Insurance after Conveyance of Title
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of the Date of Policy in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an estate or
interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by a purchase
money mortgage given by a purchaser from such insured, or so long as
such insured shall have liability by reason of convenants of warranty
made by such insured in any transfer or conveyance of such estate or
interest; provided, however, this policy shall not continue in force in
favor of any purchaser from such insured of either said estate or interest or the indebtedness secured by a money mortgage give to such
insured.
American Land Title Insurance (Amended 10-17-70).
After: 2. Continuation of Coverage
This policy protects you as long as you:
* own your title, or
* own a mortgage from anyone who buys your land, or
* are liable for any title warranties you make.
This policy protects anyone who receives your title because of your
death.
American Land Title Association, Residential Title Insurance Policy Form
2098.
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First, the consumer can take a more active role in the contract formation process when he is able to understand the agreement. A clearly written policy will not only generate consumer
awareness but also consumerism. Clearly written insurance
policies also benefit the insurer because it can delineate the coverage and control the consumer's reasonable expectations. In
the interest of contractual certainty, it is best to have the consumer pay a larger premium for a simpler policy which does not
05
qualify the coverage with detailed exclusions and limitations.
Most states have enacted legislation which allows an administrative agency to regulate the content of insurance policies. 0 6
Unfortunately, at the helm of those agencies are insurance commissioners which are understaffed and whose employees are
over worked. 0 7 Historically, the regulation of insurance policy
forms has not been a high priority with these administrative
agencies. 0 8 Perhaps the most effective way of motivating the
agencies to bring their discretionary powers to press for more
clearly written policies would be to develop consumer interest
groups. 0 9 Until insurance consumers make incomprehensible
insurance policies a political or a controversial issue, the insurance industry will continue to control the regulations.
CONCLUSION

Insurance is a business built upon the standard form contract. These contracts are increasingly being viewed as a consumer product rather than a negotiated agreement. Still the
courts must interpret these complex legal forms to which the
consumer has agreed. Consequently, courts will no longer give
105. When Sentry Insurance Company issued its "Plain Talk Car Policy"
it realized it would be granting a broader range of coverage by simplifying
the policy; however, the company concluded that it would be better to

charge the insured for the extra coverage rather than try to exclude it.
Gardner, supra note 14, at 581.
106. Goodhue, supra note 23, at 921.

107. One commentator noted: "The reluctance of states to properly provide resources to insurance [regulation] departments is matched only by
the willingness of legislators to increase the regulatory burdens on departments." Carter, The Limits of Regulatory Powers of Insurance Commissioners--An Industry Viewpoint, 13 FORUM 403, 406 (1978).

108. In order of their priority, the primary functions of insurance regulators are (1) to ensure the solvency of the insurance company, (2) to maintain fair and reasonable prices, and (3) to avoid the over-reaching of

insurers. Id. at 405.
109. Professor Keeton has observed that "[mIost insurance consumers
are unorganized, and their complaints about rates are seldom urged upon

an insurance commission unless insurance rates become a political issue ...." R. KEETON,
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565 (1971).
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literal effect to a provision that will defeat the insured's reasonable expectations.
Insurance law has gone beyond traditional contract law in
order to protect the unwary insurance consumer. The courts
can only protect one consumer at a time, on a case by case basis.
The price of that protection is contractual uncertainty and the
fragmentation of contract law. Therefore, a solution to the problem of standard form contracts is needed.
Legislative remedies provide a wholistic alternative to the
doctrine of reasonable expectations. The enactment of statutes
mandating comprehensible standard insurance contracts will
help the consumer understand his contract and enable him to
tailor his expectations accordingly. The rewording of standard
form insurance contracts into clearly written, understandable
language is a policy that should be pursued by the courts, consumers, and legislators. Such a policy will ensure that the standard form contract expresses the reasonable expectations of the
parties and allow courts to get back to the business of contract
interpretation rather than contract reconstruction. Clearly written promises will promote the realization of reasonable profits,
precedent, and expectations.
Scott B. Krider

